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“He who has beheld beauty with his eyes, 
Is already in thrall to death.” 
August, Graf von Platen-Hallermund 
 
Although many people would surely agree that art stretches and extends the ways 
we come to see the world, enhances our understanding and enriches our mental life, 
few would probably claim that art provides us with objective knowledge of the world. 
Objectivity, we hold, cannot be obtained by creating or admiring novels, sonnets, 
string quartets and films. Although these will not always simply be expressions of 
romantic souls, their common purpose is to offer rewarding experiences. And if they 
do afford us some kind of knowledge or understanding, it will always be mediated by 
the artist’s subjective view of the world. In this, artworks radically differ from scientific 
theories, which aim to show the true objective nature of things: whereas artists create 
merely subjective views of the world, scientists (or so common opinion holds) are 
able to offer theories, laws, hypotheses and solutions to problems that really concern 
the objective nature of the world, are based on a careful examination of the “facts” 
and are clearly more objective than the understanding that artworks may provide. It 
would be hard to convince anyone of the idea that, say, Giorgione’s painting The 
Tempest is more objective than Einstein’s special theory of relativity.  
Yet in Schopenhauer’s view, science is a subjectively coloured enterprise that 
merely offers knowledge that is in the service of our human desires, needs and 
interests. Scientific knowledge, he says, is knowledge that is dependent upon the 
principle of sufficient reason, i.e., it consists of solutions to problems in terms of 
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causes, grounds and reasons. Scientific knowledge is the most powerful instrument 
we possess to subjugate the world to our human categories and concepts, and 
enable us to manipulate nature to a tremendously great extent. In this sense, 
Schopenhauer claims, science is as subjective as can be, for it is in the service of the 
human desire to understand and rule the world, the need to gain insight into the 
“deep structure” of reality, in order to help human beings feel more comfortable in 
nature, to survive in it and ultimately become master of it. Thus, instead of providing 
disinterested theories, scientists generate solutions that are in the service of the 
human will to survive in nature and dominate the world.  
 
1. Will-lessness, Science, and Art 
On Schopenhauer’s view, the artist – and not the scientist – provides objective 
knowledge. Whereas scientists offer us mere subjective (i.e. will-driven) solutions to 
human problems, artists create works that are the result of will-less (i.e. disinterested) 
perception. Artists, Schopenhauer argues, are not (primarily) interested in expressing 
personal emotions. Artists offer no “human all-too-human” understanding of the world 
but want to take us beyond the narrow, human standpoint and no longer show the 
world through a human gaze; they rather provide, as it were, “a view from nowhere”, 
a perspective on things which is no longer dominated by individual interests and 
desires but instead considers the world from an impersonal, de-individualised 
viewpoint. Scientists, Schopenhauer holds, manipulate nature in order to serve 
human urges and interests, whereas artists do not. Artists create works that are not 
(necessarily) useful for human purposes. Scientific knowledge is a way to come to 
terms with inhuman nature and manipulate it in order to render it less inhuman, 
whereas artists try to show things as they are “in themselves”, i.e. as they are before 
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they are captured in and through human categories and concepts. Art shows the 
things in their nakedness, stripped from their human meanings, categories, emotions 
and interests and offers us their universal essences. Artists are no longer bearers of 
messages or vehicles of emotions. Even music – Schopenhauer’s favourite art form – 
never expresses particular emotions, but “only the inner nature, the in-itself” of 
emotions, and “does not express this or that particular and definite pleasure, this or 
that affliction, pain, sorrow, horror, gaiety, merriment, or peace of mind, but joy, pain, 
sorrow, horror, gaiety, merriment, peace of mind themselves, to a certain extent in 
the abstract, their essential nature, without any accessories, and so also without the 
motives for them” (WWR I,261). In other words, music expresses, we could say, what 
is unemotional about emotions. The purpose of music is neither the expression nor 
the arousal of human emotions, but offers bare-stripped, purified, universal and de-
humanised emotions, or (as Schopenhauer further puts it) “as it were the innermost 
soul of the phenomenon without the body”, but “united with thorough and 
unmistakable distinctness” (WWR I, 262). No wonder so many artworks have an 
alienating effect, for they show us not the world as we are used to perceiving it, i.e. a 
world full of recognisable human characteristics, categories and conceptions that 
make us feel at ease and enable us to cope with the things around us. On the 
contrary, artworks radically disturb this confident picture and enable us to enter a 
world of inhuman forces.  
Whereas scientific investigation is, according to Schopenhauer, merely a kind 
of systematic extension of our ordinary way of treating objects by which we 
manipulate and subject things to our human standpoint, aesthetic and artistic 
treatments of things offer us the most objective perception of the world. By 
introducing the notion of objectivity into the realm of aesthetics and art, 
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Schopenhauer sets out to synthesise two radically different views on disinterested 
knowledge and perception, namely Plato’s and Kant’s. In Schopenhauer’s view, 
these are perfectly compatible and, moreover, one could even say that his whole 
philosophy is – as can be gathered from the earliest manuscript remains – an (not 
always successful) effort to combine Platonic and Kantian insights. His emphasis on 
the disinterested, objective nature of aesthetic perception is perhaps the most 
emphatic instance of this complicated enterprise.  
There are different ways to observe, perceive and study the world around us: 
usually we consider it from the perspective of willing individuals. But Schopenhauer 
believes that a totally different perspective on things is possible: the standpoint of 
pure will-less subjects of knowledge (which is, as we shall see, no longer really a 
“standpoint”, for it is a view from nowhere, a perspective of a subject no longer 
governed by an ego). As human beings, Schopenhauer says (following Hume), we 
are no mere “angel heads” but embodied creatures with passions, desires, wishes, 
interests and affects, and our way of observing the objects around us is inevitably 
coloured and even determined by those subjective, personal, or individual desires 
and affects. Due to our nature as willing embodied beings, our perception of the 
world cannot be neutral, disinterested or purely objective: we ordinarily subject it to 
our personal point of view, and how we see things is always connected with our 
individual interests, desires and affects – our perception of things is a way of 
manipulating them, subjecting them to our personal perspective and interests, and 
making them useful to us. This seems to be the only possible way of considering 
things and perceiving the world, for if Schopenhauer is right that we are 
fundamentally willing beings, then our perception is inevitably influenced and even 
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determined by our nature as embodied creatures and our individual affects, interests 
and desires.  
 
2. Art, Objectivity, and Death 
The only way to escape this “interested”, typically human, manipulative way of 
considering things seems to be not considering them at all: the only way to be able to 
overcome our personal, willing and hence “interested” connection with the world is by 
giving up each and every connection with it, and ultimately giving up considering 
things altogether. This is actually a possibility which Schopenhauer takes into 
consideration seriously, and in his ethics he characterises suicide and asceticism as 
attempts to overcome our “interested” relationship with the world. In a way, 
Schopenhauer’s analysis of human beings as willing creatures does seem to have 
the radical consequence that pure will-less objectivity can be attained only if we are 
no longer there: i.e. if our existence as living, willing individuals has vanished, hence 
(or so it seems at first sight) only when we are dead. Only then the primordial unity of 
everything, i.e. the metaphysical unity of the will, will have been restored: our death 
guarantees, as it were, that the deceptive individual perspective has been abolished 
completely and reveals the ultimate Schopenhauerian truth, viz. that all is ultimately 
one and the same thing-in-itself, i.e. one cosmic will: by dying, our individuality will be 
fully and permanently absorbed into the cosmic will. So, as Nietzsche will not hesitate 
to emphasise, Schopenhauer’s view of the metaphysical nature of the world as will, 
the willing and interested nature of human perception and the idea that the individual 
can only find eternal peace by disappearing as individual, i.e. by passing away, offers 
no way out of the predicament of either the misery and suffering of individual 
subjectivity or the eternal peaceful darkness of death or nothingness.  
6 
Fortunately, however, Schopenhauer sees a way out of this predicament and 
sketches a fascinating alternative to both death and “merely subjective” perception. 
Although the whole world, including human life, is nothing but an uncanny puppet 
show of one and the same blind and ruthless will, one does not have to give up 
considering things altogether to be able to attain a state of pure, will-less, and 
painless perception or intuition (Anschauung). For, during a few scarce moments in 
our lives, all of a sudden  
 
we enter the state of pure contemplation, we are raised for the moment above 
all willing, above all desires and cares; we are, so to speak, rid of ourselves. We 
are no longer the individual that knows in the interest of its constant willing; the 
correlative of the particular thing to which objects become motives, but the 
eternal subject of knowing purified of the will, the correlative of the Idea. And we 
know that these moments, when, delivered from the fierce pressure of the will, 
we emerge, as it were, from the heavy atmosphere of the earth, are the most 
blissful that we experience. (WWR I, 390) 
 
Instead of the complete objectivity of death, Schopenhauer here characterises a 
peculiar state of consciousness, in which we are still live subjects and yet become 
aware of ourselves as pure, will-less subjects of knowledge, who have overcome the 
ordinary state of the willing individuals that we usually are. In this state of pure 
contemplation, we are raised “above all willing, above all desires and cares”, and are 
able to experience what it is to be overwhelmed by the perception of an object. This 
state of pure contemplation (in which we become one with the object we perceive) is, 
Schopenhauer argues, aesthetic. For it is what happens when a natural object or an 
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art work fascinates us in such a way that our sensory experience of it is no longer 
driven by human needs, interests, and affects. Our ordinary empirical consciousness 
of the object, which is determined by the subjective forms of space, time and 
causality, has been suspended and replaced by a pure aesthetic way of perceiving. 
We are fully absorbed in the object and lose ourselves in the contemplation of it: 
 
When, however, an external cause or inward disposition suddenly raises us out 
of the endless stream of willing, and snatches knowledge from the thraldom of 
the will, the attention is now no longer directed to the motives of willing, but 
comprehends things free from their relation to the will. Thus it considers things 
without interest, without subjectivity, purely objectively; it is entirely given up to 
them in so far as they are merely representations, and not motives. Then all at 
once the peace, always sought but always escaping us on that first path of 
willing, comes to us of its own accord, and all is well with us (uns its völlig wohl). 
(WWR I, 196; italics added)   
 
It will perhaps be hard to find a more intense and elated characterisation of the 
pleasure and even happiness inherent in aesthetic experience. Although one can 
hardly deny the enthusiasm of Schopenhauer’s characterisation of aesthetic 
experience, it is nonetheless clear that his description will definitely apply only to 
some aesthetic experiences and does not cover the whole range of the kinds of 
experiences that are commonly characterised as aesthetic.  
The passionate way in which Schopenhauer describes the aesthetic experience 
cannot be based on mere personal experience, but ought to be situated in the 
context of his basically pessimistic view of man and world. From his youth onwards, 
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Schopenhauer had been looking for a way of approaching the world that could – at 
least momentarily – offer a way out of the thraldom of the will and the suffering that is 
inextricably linked up with it. In 1812, when he was still in Berlin, he already seems to 
have identified the experience of aesthetic pleasure as the ideal way to escape from 
the misery of ordinary empirical consciousness of the world, which is full of horror 
and suffering, and enter into the blissful state of what he then still called the better 
consciousness. Ordinary consciousness is embodied, and connected with individual 
interests and desires, and since those can only be momentarily satisfied and will 
constantly be replaced by new ones, they inevitably lead to the pain of unfulfilled 
desire. The better consciousness, however, is consciousness of oneself as pure will-
less, timeless, and painless subject of knowledge. It is an “experience” of being 
purified of one’s own human individuality – which is not really an experience in the 
usual sense, for (strictly speaking) there is no individual being to experience this, but 
only a pure, de-individualised mental state and impersonal “vanishing point”, a “clear 
mirror of the object”, an imperceptible perceiver; pure awareness of harmony, 
tranquillity and even, Schopenhauer insists, “unearthly serenity” (WWR II, 380). Here 
we find the clearest instance of Schopenhauer’s fascinating blending of Platonism 
and Buddhism: in a crucial chapter on genius and artistic creativity, Schopenhauer 
even calls this mental state: 
 
the hour of inspiration, the moment of rapture or exaltation (…) the intellect’s 
becoming free, when, relieved for a while from its service under the will, it does 
not sink into inactivity or apathy, but is active for a short time, entirely alone and 
of its own accord. The intellect is then of the greatest purity, and becomes the 
clear mirror of the world… (WWR II, 380)  
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What Schopenhauer describes here is a complex state of mind which is completely 
purified of emotion, desire, needs and interests, but is by no means passive or 
apathetic. It creates a radical rupture with ordinary empirical consciousness, which is 
naturally in the service of our individual needs, urges and affects, and is – in a way – 
more passive, for it is a mere physiological reaction of our will to the environment. 
Certain experiences, Schopenhauer argues, are so intense that they are able to lift 
us above ourselves and enable us to get rid of all the excessive lumber of individual 
emotions, desires and even thoughts. Our individuality has vanished and all that is 
left is a state of de-individualised, “pure” subjectivity which is no longer determined by 
the urges of individual willing.  
Beauty thus rests on this disinterested objectivity of perception. Schopenhauer 
even claims that “everything is beautiful only so long as it does not concern us” 
(WWR II, 374). The drastic nature of this definition cannot be sufficiently stressed. All 
typically human, individual ways of considering an object are suspended and what 
remains is a subject without ego, which perceives the aesthetic object emotionless, 
thoughtless – we come to see the world “from outside” (WWR I, 372). 
Schopenhauer’s characterisation of beauty is, to say the least, unusual. An 
experience of beauty is, in his terms, abnormal: a purely disinterested, will-less and 
detached (but also, paradoxically, unusually intense and focussed) state of 
consciousness, in which we have transcended our individual interests, and have 
ultimately become the object’s “pure mirror” (WWR II, 367). We have become 
somehow disengaged and even estranged from the world, for we have adopted a 
stance in which “the entire consciousness is filled and occupied by a single image of 
perception” (WWR I, 179).  
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This “abnormal” aesthetic state of mind cannot proceed from a conscious act of 
will (Akt der Willkür): we cannot decide to enter into the blessed state of the better 
consciousness but will always be stimulated by an object that we are fascinated by 
and through which we can enter into a peaceful, timeless and tranquil state of mind: 
 
The change in the subject required for this, just because it consists in the 
elimination of all willing, cannot proceed from the will, and hence cannot be an 
arbitrary act of will, in other words, cannot rest with us. (…) Such a state of itself 
eliminates the will from consciousness, and in it all things stand before us with 
enhanced clearness and distinctness, so that we are aware almost alone of 
them and hardly at all of ourselves. Therefore our whole consciousness is 
hardly anything more than the medium through which the perceived object 
appears in the world as representation. Thus pure will-less knowledge is 
reached by the consciousness of other things being raised to so high a potential 
that the consciousness of our own selves vanishes. For we apprehend the 
world purely objectively, only when we no longer know that we belong to it; and 
all things appear the more beautiful, the more we are conscious merely of them, 
and the less we are conscious of ourselves. (WWR II, 367-368) 
 
This passage reveals how far removed Schopenhauer’s theory of aesthetic 
perception is from Kant’s analysis of aesthetic judgment. Although Schopenhauer’s 
will-lessness clearly echoes Kant’s concept of disinterestedness, Schopenhauer 
radically breaks with the idea that aesthetic experience is based on the reflection and 
feeling of a judging subject. Schopenhauer’s aesthetic subject is a subject in which 
the capacity to judge – not only of determining but also of reflecting judgment – has 
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vanished altogether. Schopenhauer’s pure aesthetic subject does not judge, it is not 
detached in the sense that it takes some distance to be able to judge the object; it is, 
on the contrary, totally swallowed and taken in by the object. It does not behave as 
someone who, after many years, meets an old friend again and studies her features 
to see whether she has changed much, but as a passionate lover who is so madly in 
love that he forgets everything, even himself, and melts together with the other and 
becomes one with her. And perhaps even this comparison is not really accurate 
enough, since Schopenhauer warns us against too romantic an identification of 
aesthetic beauty with amorous passion (WWR II, 374): despite his use of terms such 
as rapture, exaltation and enjoyment, the type of awareness he describes, makes 
clear that an aesthetic experience is not so much a matter of emotions, affects or 
feelings, but of inner peace, serenity, complete objectivity and painless contemplation; 
willing is expelled from consciousness.  
In this sense, his account is clearly reminiscent of Plato’s pure knowledge of 
the soul. For Plato, however, an experience of beauty is a festive celebration of Being: 
it is (as in Kant) to feel alive. On Schopenhauer’s account, though, having an 
aesthetic experience is an intimation of death: the world has become “something 
foreign” to us (WWR II, 387), for we are pure detached subjects that have become 
one with the object of our perception. We lose ourselves and “become the pure mirror 
of the objective inner nature of things” (WWR II, 367); “we have stepped into another 
world  (…) where everything that moves our will (…) no longer exists” (WWR I, 197), 
and are aware only of the deprivation of everything that is typical of individual human 
being (see WWR I, 178; I, 195-6). We have become will-less, timeless, and totally 
disengaged subjects – subjects without ego; so hardly subjects at all, since we 
remain “wholly foreign to, and detached from, the scene to be contemplated”, and 
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adopt “the view from nowhere” (WWR II, 373; see Nagel 1986). We have become so 
overwhelmed by the perception of the object, that we are no longer conscious of our 
individual selves anymore, and have temporarily become disposed of our own living 
nature, our own will to life (Ibid.).  
Aesthetic consciousness is not merely an escape from the torments of our 
existence as willing subjects, though, but also offers us understanding and 
knowledge. A peculiar type of knowledge, however: not based on (determinate) 
concepts, as is the case in the “subjective” kind of knowledge that is scientific 
knowledge, for instance, but knowledge of, what Schopenhauer calls, (Platonic) 
Ideas. 
 
3. Objective Knowledge of (Platonic) Ideas 
As noted above, Schopenhauer was always fascinated by the possibility of a “better 
consciousness”, not only as a kind of awareness that enables us to escape from the 
sufferings that are inherent in our nature as willing individuals, but also as a path to a 
superior kind of knowledge and understanding which transcends the ordinary way of 
perceiving and coping with the world around us and our position in it (WWR I, 372; 
WWR II, 386).  
 Ordinary knowledge needs concepts to be able to understand the things 
around us and carve nature at its joints. In the aesthetic state of consciousness 
described above, however, the object is not known by means of concepts; aesthetic 
cognition is not characterised by the conceptual clarity and rigid distinctions typical of 
scientific insights, for “we are entirely satisfied by the impression of a work of art only 
when it leaves behind something that, in spite of all our reflection on it, we cannot 
bring down to the distinctness of a concept” (WWR II, 409). Although Schopenhauer 
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continually identifies the Ideas as Platonic – as timeless, universal essences – this 
crucial observation intimates that his characterisation of artwork in terms of vehicles 
of knowledge and understanding that transcend our conceptual knowledge of objects 
is close to Kant’s suggestion that works of art communicate aesthetic ideas. 
Aesthetic ideas, Kant says, are the products of the artist’s imagination, which strives 
“toward something that lies beyond the bounds of experience” – or more precisely, 
“inner intuitions (innern Anschauungen) to which no concept can be completely 
adequate” (Kant, 1987, § 49, 5:314). This is exactly the thought that we find in 
Schopenhauer, but it should not blind us to the important differences between their 
respective views: artistic imagination in Kant is “productive”, for it invents intuitions 
and produces new configurations, whereas for Schopenhauer the Ideas are the 
timeless universals which the artist merely discovers by adopting an objectifying, 
disinterested and de-personalised stance towards the world. Nonetheless, the 
suggestion that art works communicate Ideas that offer a kind of understanding or 
knowledge that cannot be reduced to the knowledge we gain through concepts is 
important, for it gives the lie to those that consider aesthetic knowledge to be inferior 
to the (scientific and philosophical) sort of knowledge that is conceptual in nature. 
Yet what kind of knowledge Schopenhauer has in mind when he characterises 
will-less aesthetic knowledge in terms of knowledge of timeless Ideas still remains 
puzzling. One commentator offers the following: “The Ideas might just be ordinary 
perceptual objects (…) their universality having to do (…) with the selectiveness of 
attention paid to them by the observer (…) Perceiving an Idea (…) is a matter of 
perceiving an ordinary object but with one’s attention focussed on its essential, and 
away from its inessential aspects.” (Young 1987, 434) What is significant in an object, 
though, does not necessarily coincide with the “universal” it is supposed to be an 
14 
instance of (see Janaway 1996, 53). What is significant in an object is not necessarily 
something universal. In artworks minute details of brushwork, colour hues, voice 
timbre, etc. are often more artistically relevant and significant than the ideas 
conveyed. Moreover, the universal ideas that are expressed in some masterpiece 
painting may often be rather trivial. If the way in which the artist renders the subject-
matter does not really engage us in stimulating and moving ways and enrich our 
imaginative capacities, the art work will not be of much value (and will definitely not 
lead to the blissful state of the “better consciousness” which Schopenhauer identifies 
as the aesthetic attitude). Good art not only occasions interesting ideas but develops 
our capacities for discrimination and appreciation. The value of a work of art mainly 
depends on the way it penetrates and shapes our grasp of the ideas and attitudes 
conveyed. Art’s cognitive value cannot be reduced to the ideas – Platonic or not – 
that they express and communicate. The way in which they stimulate our imaginative 
perception and shape our discriminatory capacities is at least as important a value of 
good art as conveying crucial thoughts or ideas might be.  
Schopenhauer’s Platonic idealism fails to accommodate for the particularly 
valuable way in which art can express ideas, thoughts, emotions and attitudes. This 
is a fundamental value of good art, though. Take any work by such masters as Roger 
van der Weyden, Lorenzo Lotto, René Magritte and Alberto Giacometti, for example. 
The ideas they convey and themes they treat may at times be very trivial, but the 
value of their work does not solely (nor perhaps primarily) depend on the content of 
the ideas they communicate. It is the sophisticated, complex and often radical way 
those artists challenge, shape and transform our visual attention and imagination, 
using multiple revolutionary techniques and contrasting distinct detailing which 
renders some of their works eminent masterpieces. Schopenhauer does pay some 
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attention to the exquisite way in which Dutch still-life painters manage to direct “such 
purely objective perception to the most insignificant objects, and set up a lasting 
monument of their objectivity and spiritual peace in paintings of still life”, and “in the 
same spirit landscape painters, especially Ruysdael, have often painted extremely 
insignificant landscape objects, and have thus produced the same effect even more 
delightfully” (WWR I, 197).  
Yet he seems too preoccupied with defending art against Plato’s estimation of 
it. Plato claimed that art is worthless and even harmful, since it only offers the illusion 
of knowledge and leads us away from a genuine understanding of the world. Contra 
Plato, Schopenhauer argues that art can afford true knowledge and understanding. 
Now he is so eager to repudiate Plato’s scathingly negative estimation of art by 
offering a Platonic answer himself, that he does not pay sufficient attention to the way 
in which art can be cognitively significant, not because it necessarily conveys 
universal, timeless, Platonic Ideas, but (more importantly) due to the way it shapes, 
expands and deepens our cognitive and imaginative capacities and enriches our 
mental life. The way in which such artists as Orlandus Lassus, Bach, Shakespeare, 
Keats, Wilde, Rothko, Pollock, Magritte, etc. have been successful in modifying the 
forms, styles and media through which they transmit their ideas explains the 
significance and timeless value of their work. Not (primarily) because they 
communicated universal or revolutionary ideas, but because they expressed their 
ideas in an absorbing, touching and enriching way, and shaped how we look at what 
their art expresses. Thus what matters is not primarily the nature or content of the 
ideas themselves, but whether the media and styles of representing or expressing 
them deepen our responses to them and shape and modify our grasp of the ideas 
conveyed – and not necessarily, as Schopenhauer would have it, how they enable us 
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to adopt an objectifying, “disengaged” stance towards the miseries of the world, in 
which we feel no longer concerned by them. 
 
4. Tragic Art, Concerned Individuals, and the Objective Stance 
Although Schopenhauer emphasises the tranquil nature of aesthetic contemplation, 
this does not really apply to all art forms, and does not apply to the effects of tragedy 
at all. Whereas observing a tulip or still-life painting can definitely have a soothing 
effect on us, a tragedy compels us to attend to features of life we normally tend to 
shy away from. It makes us dwell on bloodshed, murder, and cruel violence. By 
foregrounding the evil aspects in particularly vivid and striking ways, it invites or even 
forces us to focus on the disturbing aspects of humanity, which is ultimately vicious, 
unjust and ugly. A tragedy confronts the spectator with, what Schopenhauer calls, 
“the guilt of existence itself” (WWR I, 254) and the bitterness and uselessness of life, 
and hence with the futility of all our individual striving. Hence, the aesthetic spectator 
experiences uneasiness and even disgust, for he understands “that it is better to tear 
his heart away from life, to turn his willing away from it, not to love the world and life”, 
and “thus in the depth of his being the consciousness is then stirred that for a 
different kind of willing there must be a different kind of existence also” (WWR II, 
435). Schopenhauer even writes that the best tragedies show us:  
 
… those powers that destroy happiness and life, and in such a way that the 
path to them is at any moment open even to us. We see the greatest suffering 
brought about by entanglements whose essence could be assumed even by our 
own fate, and by actions that perhaps even we might be capable of committing, 
and so we cannot complain of injustice. Then, shuddering, we feel ourselves 
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already in the midst of hell (dann fühlen wir schaudernd uns schon mitten in der 
Hölle). (WWR I, 255)  
 
Tragedy not only depicts the renunciation of the will on stage, but also apparently 
makes the spectators shudder at the depicted horrors. The word “shuddering” 
(schaudernd) is especially striking here. The force of a tragedy seems to be that it 
truly involves an individual human being and necessitates a personal (or subjective) 
reaction. Without any personal involvement as a spectator, we would not be moved 
at all by what the characters on stage have to endure. So it is not the pure subject of 
knowledge, the subject without I, described above, which seems to be explicitly 
addressed by tragedy. Contrary to other forms of art, tragedies do not address 
detached aesthetic subjects, but concerned individuals that are able to empathise 
with the characters and events on stage. And while the younger Schopenhauer still 
thought that the renunciation of the will occurs principally in the characters of the play 
and not in the spectator, later (in the 1844 edition of The World as Will and 
Representation) he realises that forsaking our personal interests and desires 
necessarily presupposes the personal involvement of a willing individual. And even 
already in 1818 he writes the following about the effects of tragedy: 
  
In one individual [the will] appears powerfully, in another more feebly. Here and 
there it reaches thoughtfulness and is softened more or less by the light of 
knowledge, until at last in the individual case this knowledge is purified and 
enhanced by suffering itself. It then reaches the point where the phenomenon, 
the veil of Maya, no longer deceives it. It sees through the form of the 
phenomenon, the principium individuationis; the egoism resting on this expires 
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with it. The motives that were previously so powerful now lose their force, and 
instead of them, the complete knowledge of the real nature of the world, acting 
as a quieter of the will, produces resignation, the giving up not merely of life, but 
of the whole will to life itself. (WWR I, 253)  
 
We are surprisingly far removed from a purely aesthetic experience – at least in the 
sense in which Schopenhauer interprets the term “aesthetic”. It is therefore worth 
noting that in the second volume of The World as Will and Representation, published 
in 1844, Schopenhauer draws an analogy between the effects of tragedy and the 
feeling of the sublime (das Erhabene), for the tragic consists in enjoying that which 
“directly opposes the will” (WWR II, 433; see also Vandenabeele 2003). 
Schopenhauer sets out to explain the “paradox of tragedy”, which dates back to 
Aristotle, i.e. how we can take pleasure in horrifying events (see Vandenabeele 2007, 
574-578; 2008, 199-208). He attempts to do so by insisting that we comprehend the 
depicted events as terrible for humanity in general, and not just for our individual 
selves (see Alex Neill’s contribution to this volume.) For Schopenhauer, tragedy 
stands apart from other art forms, because it does not merely offer an aesthetically 
rewarding experience but first and foremost yields an ethically significant insight into 
the true nature of man and world. It offers us a universal Idea of human existence, 
and thus induces a pure will-less, objective state of mind. This arguably explains our 
fascination for tragedies, i.e. explains why we do not merely turn away from them in 
utter horror and disgust.  
 Schopenhauer’s emphasis on the objective nature of artistic knowledge shows 
the deep unity underlying not merely the different art forms (architecture, painting, 
sculpture, literature, and music too), but also of Schopenhauerian aesthetics and 
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ethics as such. Although Schopenhauer clearly (and justly) distinguishes playful 
aesthetic appreciation from serious ethical judgment and action (WWR I, 267), he 
does draw interesting parallels between both, stressing their fundamental unity. Art 
may be merely “the camera obscura which shows the objects more purely, and 
enables us to survey and comprehend them better. It is the play within the play, the 
stage on the stage in Hamlet” (WWR I, 266-267) and the artist “bears the cost of 
producing that play; in other words, he himself is the will objectifying itself and 
remaining in constant suffering”, whereas in the ethical man par excellence – “the 
saint who has attained resignation” – the will freely abolishes itself and the will to life 
is completely denied (WWR I, 285). Yet, despite the important differences between 
aesthetic contemplation and ethical resignation (which we cannot deal with here), it 
will be clear that, on Schopenhauer’s view, there is a common factor that binds the 
two inextricably together. This common factor will again be best illustrated by 
focusing on tragic art. 
 The value of tragedy does not reside solely in aesthetic contemplation, but in 
understanding that it may be better to give up willing altogether. Its chief merit, 
Schopenhauer holds, lies in the peculiar kind of understanding it offers and the 
ethical stance it may henceforth provoke in a spectator. Schopenhauer has misled 
several commentators by concentrating on the old (Aristotelian) question of how 
something tragic can still offer us pleasure (see Vandenabeele 2008). But the value 
of tragedy does not ultimately lie in the pleasure it may yield despite its depiction of 
bleak and horrific contents, but in the specific ethical attitude it may generate, which 
is, for Schopenhauer, valuable in its own right and may lead to salvation and 
enlightenment through, what he calls, the complete denial of the will to life. All art – 
and hence definitely also the highest of all the poetic arts: tragedy – merely offers a 
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certain consolation that makes us momentarily forget life’s appalling miseries (WWR 
I, 372) and yields a better understanding of the world and ourselves. At best, it 
awakens for a few moments the desire for “an existence of an entirely different kind, 
a different world” (WWR II, 433). The experience of utter horror and even disgust at 
the sight of the terrible events moves us personally and prompts us to turn away from 
the will to life, instead of remaining in peaceful contemplation of it. Thus at least part 
of our experience of a tragedy is therefore not pleasurable at all, but this does not 
make it less valuable for it, on the contrary. Tragedy is even superior to other art 
forms, for it makes us understand the real (limited) value of our lives as human 
beings and the world we live in.  
 Yet Schopenhauer confuses the distinction between a universal and a 
particular truth with the distinction between a truth that is grasped by a will-less 
subject and a truth that is grasped by a willing individual. A tragedy does 
communicate universal truths through particular events and individual characters on 
stage, but this does not rule out that it may also demand a spectator’s personal 
involvement. And only because of this personal involvement can tragedy get the 
profound significance it really deserves. One gains some kind of understanding or 
knowledge from a tragedy. Again, watching a tragedy is not a purely aesthetic 
experience in this sense. The value of great tragedies such as Othello and 
Wallenstein is tightly entwined with a profound concern for the rough and brutish 
aspects of human nature, and does not involve merely the intellect’s escaping the 
service of the will and operating in a disinterested way. Since what we learn from 
tragedies about the world and human nature is undoubtedly horrifying, it can be 
justified only through deliverance (Erlösung) from suffering and life, complete 
resignation and “denial” or abolition of the will (see WWR I, 397).  
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 As Schopenhauer himself recognises, the horror “is brought terribly near to us” 
and “shows us those powers that destroy happiness and life, and in such a way that 
the path to them is at any moment open even to us” (WWR I, 254-255; italics added). 
Experiencing tragic art really involves being confronted with horrifying truths that 
affect us directly as concerned individuals; truths which cannot be turned into 
pleasurable spectacles that can be contemplated by a detached pure subject of 
knowing. On the contrary, the essence of the experience of a tragedy is not that it 
compels us to contemplate the world but instead makes us “turn away from the will to 
life itself” (WWR II, 433).  
 “Turning away from the will to life itself” is, however, exactly the kind of 
transformation that – despite their obvious differences – ultimately unifies aesthetic 
and ethical “experience” in Schopenhauer’s view. What Schopenhauer 
acknowledges as characteristic of both the aesthetic and the ethical attitude toward 
life, is the hardly expressible state of mind, which we identified above as objective. 
This objective state of mind, Schopenhauer insists, cannot really be positively 
described in philosophical terms, but “can be expressed only negatively as denial of 
the will” (WWR I, 410). It cannot be positively known or “experienced” – at least, not 
when “experience” is understood in its ordinary, “human” sense – but some people 
can gain access to it, often through severe discipline and heavy effort. Paradoxically 
enough, this state of “objective knowledge” cannot really be called knowledge 
anymore, since “it no longer has the form of subject and object” (WWR I, 410): it is an 
“experience” that “cannot be further communicated” (Ibid.) – it is, what Schopenhauer 
calls, knowledge sub specie aeternitatis (i.e. under the aspect of eternity).  
 Understanding that it may be better to turn ourselves away from this wretched 
world may be an important effect of, for instance, watching a tragedy, but whether 
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this kind of insight really provides pleasure is highly questionable. Of course, it may 
provide pleasure if we have the sense that we have discovered something important 
about ourselves or about the world, if we understand that the work has shaped and 
deepened our thoughts through our experience of it. But claiming that art is valuable 
merely because of the pleasure this insight or understanding arouses is – to say the 
least – highly implausible. As Matthew Kieran says, “art stretches, extends and 
revolutionises the ways we come to see the world. It is one of the most powerful 
means of cultivating our perceptual capacities” (Kieran 2005, 147), and, we might 
add, of enriching our understanding of the world and ourselves. 
 Tragic art “furnishes us a vivid illustration of the frustration of human effort and 
of the vanity of this whole existence (…) and thereby reveals life’s deepest meaning”, 
Schopenhauer argues. Hence, tragedy enables us “to will something better” and 
escape from this dreadful life steeped in suffering, no more no less (WWR II, 635; 
WWR II, 574). The idea that it would be wiser to turn away from life altogether arises 
“only in an obscure feeling” (ibid.). It merely offers some sort of intuitive 
understanding that it might be better not to interfere in the “natural course of things” 
and instead calmly and compassionately welcome the events of life (see Cartwright’s 
contribution to this volume).   
 
5. The Objectivity of Art and the Abolition of the Self 
Despite what some commentators suggest, Schopenhauer does not, however, 
expect art – not even tragic art – directly to offer resignation. The sedation and 
abolition of the will to life is ultimately an effect of grace: 
 
23 
Now since (…) that self-elimination of the will (Selbstaufhebung des Willens) 
comes from knowledge, but all knowledge and insight as such are independent 
of free choice, that denial of willing, that entrance into freedom, is not to be 
forcibly arrived at by intention or design, but comes from the innermost relation 
of knowing and willing in man; hence, it comes suddenly, as if flying from 
without. Therefore, the Church calls it the effect of grace; but just as she still 
represents it as depending on the acceptance of grace, so too the effect of the 
quieter or sedative (Quietiv) is ultimately an act of the freedom of the will. In 
consequence of such an effect of grace, man’s whole inner nature is 
fundamentally changed and reversed, so that he no longer wills anything of all 
that he previously willed so intensely; thus a new man, so to speak, actually 
takes the place of the old. For this reason, the Church calls this consequence of 
the effect of grace new birth or regeneration. For what she calls the natural 
man, to whom she denies all capacity for good, is that very will to life that must 
be denied if salvation is to be attained from an existence like ours. Behind our 
existence lies something that becomes accessible to us only by our shaking off 
the world. (WWR I, 404-405) 
 
Thus works of art, especially those that confront us with the more tragic aspects of 
life, may awaken in us some kind of enlightened understanding and offer us a “new 
birth or regeneration” (WWR I, 404; see also WWR II, 574), although whether or not 
we will enter into this enlightened state, this “kingdom of grace”, wherein our will to 
life vanishes completely and our “whole being is fundamentally changed and 
reversed”, is not within our control: it is “the effect of grace” (WWR I, 403; I, 404). 
This sudden radical transformation from my life as a willing individual to a state of 
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pure objectivity – for this is what Schopenhauer alludes to – is not something that I 
can deliberately intend or will. On the contrary, willing and striving to attain a will-less 
objective stance may well be the worst possible way to achieve it (see Reginster 
2009, 104-108). But aesthetic perception – which is itself more often than not a state 
of grace – can still be an excellent occasion to reach this blessed will-less state, 
which is “man’s greatest prerogative” (WWR I, 404), for it saves us from the 
damaging influence of the will to life.  
 Aesthetic contemplation thus not only enables us to escape misery and 
boredom, but also offers us at least a fleeting glimpse of another, “objective” world, 
and may ultimately lead to a more permanent attainment of an ethical stance of 
complete resignation, which transcends the common, “natural” and egocentric 
attitude that we usually occupy as ordinary willing individuals (see Wicks 2008, 127-
141; 188-190). The objective apprehension of the world, which we attain through 
aesthetic contemplation and art, may yield the insight that our individual selves may 
not be as important as we happen to think from our narrow, bigoted perspectives, 
and add to our lives the deep tranquillity, complete serenity, and inner peace that so 
many of us long for but never attain – governed as our lives are by the principium 
individuationis and the sheer torments of the will to life: 
 
But we now turn our glance from our own needy and perplexed nature to those 
who have overcome the world, in whom the will, having reached complete self-
knowledge, has found itself again in everything, and then freely denied itself, 
and who then merely wait to see the last trace of the will vanish with the body 
that is animated with that trace. Then, instead of the restless pressure and 
effort; instead of the constant transition from desire to apprehension and from 
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joy to sorrow; instead of the never satisfied and never-dying hope that 
constitutes the life-dream of the man who wills, we see that peace that is higher 
than all reason, that ocean-like calmness of the spirit, that deep tranquillity, that 
unshakable confidence and serenity, whose mere reflection in the countenance, 
as depicted by Raphael and Correggio, is a complete and certain gospel. Our 
knowledge remains; our will has vanished. (WWR I, 411) 
 
This passage reveals the radical nature of the transformation Schopenhauer is 
talking about: true knowledge, i.e. the understanding attained through the 
disinterested perception of aesthetic objects (and, through these, of universal Ideas), 
may ultimately quieten the will and bring about the abolition of nothing less than 
myself as such, i.e. of my “real self”, for “the real self is the will to life” (WWR II, 606). 
When this happens, knowledge does not merely escape the service of the will, as in 
pure aesthetic contemplation, but leads to the complete self-suppression of the will, 
which characterises ethical resignation and ultimately involves the elimination of the 
willing self. This radical abolition of the self induces genuine peace of mind, freedom 
and salvation (Heil), and deliverance from suffering and, hence, from life – or 
“Nirvana”, as the Buddhists call it (see Wicks 2008, 87-94) – beyond good and evil, 
since “after the arrival of the ‘new birth’, the morality or immorality of previous 
conduct becomes a matter of indifference” (WWR I, 357; II, 607; see also II, 608 ff.). 
This state of complete repose, which cannot be brought on by a resolve or an act of 
will, but “comes suddenly as if flying in from without” (WWR I, 404), is not an 
experience of something positive, and can only be reached by whomever has given 
up his “real self”. Nothing positive has really been attained – apart from the fact that 
one has reached a state of complete objectivity and tranquillity. But this peace, 
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tranquillity and genuine freedom is not human peace, tranquillity and freedom, but an 
inhuman empty stance, in which the illusory character of ordinary empirical 
knowledge has been unmasked and “the veil of Maya” has been torn to pieces; now 
we really know and we return, as it were, to a more “natural” and “original” unity with 
all that is and has been. The abolition of the will in us is at the same time the 
disappearance of our personal characters, our (willing) selves; our personal 
standpoint vanishes (or, which is basically the same, broadens endlessly) until life 
and death, right and wrong, dream and reality ultimately become “one and the same” 
again and return to their authentic primordial unity.  
 What then remains, when the will is abolished, is nothingness (WWR I, 409-
412). No more thoughts to be thought, no more feelings to be felt, no more emotions 
to be disturbed by; not even silence, darkness or light – nothing. This is all that is left 
to those in whom the will has denied itself. Not much, many people will put forward 
now, and they are probably right. But perhaps Schopenhauer might also be right after 
all: for those, who are still occupied by their own desires, emotions and interests, who 
are striving to be happy and successful and desperately long to be loved, and who 
refuse to let things take their natural course, are surely not better off – for they are 
not even able to eschew superfluous suffering and unnecessary illusion.1    
 
See also 2 Schopenhauer on Scientific Knowledge; 10 Schopenhauer and Platonic Ideas; 17 
Schopenhauer on the Metaphysics of Art and Morality; 18 Schopenhauer on the Value of Compassion; 
19 Schopenhauer and Indian Philosophy; 20 Life-Denial versus Life-Affirmation: Schopenhauer and 
Nietzsche on Pessimism and Asceticism; 24 Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Wagner 
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